Category Archives: North

African Peace Militaries War, Peace and Democratic Governance


About the Editor

David J. Francis is the most recent Head of Department of Peace Studies and is currently Director of the John and Elnora Ferguson Centre for African Studies (JEFCAS), at the University of Bradford, UK. He is author/editor of eight books, including US Strategy in Africa (ed. Routledge, 2010).


This book provides a critical understanding of the emerging role of African militaries in peacetime democratic Africa.

This book departs from the dominant perspective which simply presents the military as an ‘enemy’ of democracy because of the history and legacy of unending military coup d’états and interventions in civilian politics. In the context of Africa, the military has been blamed or largely held responsible for instigating wars, armed conflicts, political violence, poverty and underdevelopment due to bad governance and mismanagement of the state. Drawing from diverse case studies across Africa, including Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia and Egypt, this volume presents the argument that though the military has played a negative, and sometimes, destructive role in undermining constitutional rule and the overthrow of democratic civilian governments, the same military, now operating in a changed global environment, is making effort to support the development of democracy and democratic consolidation as well as remain subjected to civilian democratic oversight and control. Notwithstanding, the real challenge for this emerging trend of African peace militaries is the extent to which they are able to fulfil, on a predictable and consistent basis, their constitutional mandate to defend the people against ‘elected autocrats’ in Africa who try to use the military to perpetuate themselves in power.

This work fills a critical gap in the literature and will be of much interest to students of African security and politics, peace and conflict studies, security studies and IR in general.

Table of Contents

1. African Militaries in War, Peace and Support for Democratic Development, David J. Francis

2. The Military in Nigeria: War, peace and support for democratic governance, Oshita Oshita

3. The Rwanda Defence Force: from Genocide to Peace and Democratic Consolidation, Marco Jowell

4. Military in Uganda: war, peace and support for democratic consolidation, Eric Awich Ochen

5. Military Response to Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Implications for Peace, Security and Democracy in the Lake Chad Basin, Kenneth C. Omeje

6. African Solutions to Western Problems: Western-sponsored Training Programmes for African Militaries: impact on Peace and Democratic Consolidation, David Chuter

7. African Standby Force: Challenges and Opportunities for support of Democracy in Africa, Kasaija Phillip Apuuli

8. African Militaries, Security Sector Reform and Peace Dividends: a case study of Ethiopia’s post-1998 Defence Reform Experience and impact on Democratic Development, Ann Fitz-Gerald, Paula MacPhee & Ian Westerman

9. Egypt: the Military in War, Peace and Democratic Development, Joseph Lansana Kormoh


JEFCAS Seminar Series: Sudan: still an Unstable State?

Venue: Pemberton Room 2.11

Date:  Wed 3rd May 2017

Time: 16:00 – 18:00

Speaker: Professor Peter Woodward (University of Reading)


About Prof Peter Woodward:

Professor Peter Woodward worked for the VSO in Kosti, Sudan from 1966-67 and then became a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Khartoum until 1971 when he joined the Department of Politics at the University of Reading. He was also a Visiting Lecturer at the University of Natal, Durban in 1991 and 1993, and at the American University in Cairo in 1999.

Professor Woodward is regularly consulted on African affairs by various branches of government in several countries including the FCO; DFID; the US House of Representatives sub-committee on Africa; and US State Department. He also contributes to various media outlets, most regularly to the BBC World Service. He acted as Rapporteur for Sudan peace talks at the Carter Center in 1993, Chaired jointly by President Jimmy Carter and Archbishop Desmond Tutu; and Chaired constitutional talks on Sudan for the International Dialogues Foundation, Durham, 1999.

Annual Peace Studies & International Development Conference: Resources, Conflict and Development in Africa

The annual Peace Studies & International Development conference for Africanist doctoral students and early post-doctoral career scholars and practitioners is scheduled to take place on the 11th May 2017 at the University of Bradford in United Kingdom.

The conference theme is: Resources, Conflict and Development in Africa.

Conference cluster themes include:

1) Natural Resources and Conflict

2) Transition from Resource Conflict to Peace and Peacebuilding

3) Natural Resources, Demographic Change and Development

4) Conflict, Security, Peace and Development Nexus

5) Regional Integration, Security and Development

6) Africa and the Rest of the World
The conference is open to doctoral students and early career scholars, researchers and practitioners. Potential participants and paper presenters are required to submit an Abstract of 200 – 300 words on or before 15th November 2016 to:    
All shortlisted participants will be required to submit the first draft of their papers at least two months before the conference. The conference is expected to result in a co-edited book (Lead Editor: Professor Kenneth Omeje, Senior Research Fellow, John & Elnora Ferguson Centre of African Studies, University of Bradford). Kindly note that all short-listed participants will be responsible for the full-cost of their participation, including visa, travels, accommodation and subsistence.

For full details on the conference: conference-call-oct-2016-revised-version-1

The Rise of African Islamists

[Image credit: European Commission_Boko Haram Displaced in Yola_June 2015]

Zaf Shah is currently in his final year of International Relations and Security Studies at the University of Bradford. He has previously advised local government on the PVE (preventing violent extremism) agenda, and has also provided training to the West Yorkshire Police on community Cohesion and Racial Awareness. His appointment as a Muslim affairs specialist allowed development and better understanding of Muslim affairs from a local community perspective. Zaf has also worked in Pakistan at a local Madrassah which gave him a valuable insight into the world of violent extremism

Over the last fifty years or so Africa’s wars have been well documented, but ironically these weren’t always wars where violent religious groups were vying for control of the region or its resources. Throughout the last fifteen years, conflict theorists and academics alike have focussed their efforts on the conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.  Indeed, the tide has turned and there is now a different kind of threat.

Whilst the United States and its allies had concentrated its military might in the Middle East fighting a supposed ‘war on terror’, Islamist groups such as Al Shabbab, Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb regrouped and took advantage of the chaotic conflict patterns in Africa. Warfare is returning to Africa through intra state religious conflicts, pitting the aforementioned violent Islamists against state powers in geographical regions of West and Central Africa in particular, along with of course the Horn and Somalia. It serves to briefly mention the difference between Islam and religionised politics of Islamism, which strives to employ religious symbols for political aims. Islamism originates from by and large a political interpretation of Islam. Therefore it is fair to say that Islamism is about political order and not faith.

Indeed, Western Analysts are now beginning to view this as a new frontier on the so-called ‘war on terror’. What couldn’t be ignored was the appearance of several African fighters in the ranks of combatants in Iraq and the success of Islamist forces firstly, gaining overall control of Somalia and secondly, engaging in a proxy war against the US and her allies. Affected African states no longer have a monopoly on power, and arguably are struggling to control the threat of terror groups from operating with relative impunity, with very few prosecutions or at least the legal framework to do the same. This of course means that state structures are weak and lack meaningful leadership to challenge this new threat.

A case in point being Nigeria, who has yet to dismantle North

Illegal migrants caught at the coast of Souq al Jum'aa region in Tripoli, Libya, March 2015. Total of 97 migrants from Senegal, Mali, Cameroon, Nigeria and Liberia [Image credit: Mail & Guaridan, from Mustafa Bag/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images]
“Illegal” migrants caught at the coast of Souq al Jum’aa region in Tripoli, Libya, March 2015. Total of 97 migrants from Senegal, Mali, Cameroon, Nigeria and Liberia [Image credit: Mail & Guaridan, from Mustafa Bag/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images]
Eastern Nigeria, based Boko Haram, who have been responsible for the killing of thousands of civilians and kidnappings since its inception fourteen years ago. Boko Haram and a dozen or so other terrorist groups have pledged their allegiance to Isil (Daesh) who have taken over swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria. With little or no control of terrorist groups and their ability to coordinate and attack civilians, means like the  2013 shopping mall attack in Kenya that African based Islamist terror can strike in any part of Africa at any given moment.  Bangui, the Central African Republic city has probably seen the most brutal effect of sectarian conflict playing out on the streets of this once harmonious region, where Muslims and Christians lived side by side. A report released by the International Rescue Committee said that more than 6,000 people have been killed since the conflict began and more than 2.7 million people are in need of emergency assistance (WNG2015). The locals blame the hatred for one another on Islamist terror groups operating in the region.

With conflicts between Muslims and Christians playing out in a number of African countries, it is no wonder that much of Europe is now faced with a migrant crisis on its borders.


World News Group (2015) Daily Dispatches. Central African Republic still rife with conflict a year after ceasefire [Online] Asheville. Available from: [Accessed August 10 2015]

Enter Ethiopia: Africa Study Visit 2015, Part 2

[Image: Preparing for departure to Addis Ababa from Turkey]

Andrea Alvord is a student in the University of Bradford’s African Peace and Conflict Studies Master’s programme.  She is a native of Zimbabwe and a naturalised US citizen.  She graduated from Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee with a B.A. in English and was commissioned as an officer in the US Navy, where she served for eleven years prior to returning to the world of academia. 

[Part 1 of this series can be found here and the photo gallery here]

In the weeks of class meetings leading up to our departure for Ethiopia, the students and leaders of the African Study Visit discussed how Ethiopia is or is not the exception in Africa. The country is unique in both its history and current ethnic-federal government structure. Europeans never colonized Ethiopia, although not for lack of effort. The Ethiopian Army defeated the Italians in the Battle of Adwa in 1896, a point of immense national Ethiopian (and pan-African) pride. The Italians returned for five years during World War II and reminders of their occupation are found across the country from supermarket shelves flush with pasta, to the merkato (famous as the largest market on the continent), Addis Ababa’s piazzas, and the incongruous sight of a coffee shop quality espresso machine in a tiny tin shack on a dirt path next to Lake Hawassa. One of my Italian classmates who was not part of the study visit had referred to Ethiopia as “our colony” and I hastily corrected (or should I say, educated) him!

His comment proved salient as the question of “who’s history?” repeated throughout the trip. If we were speaking of Ethiopian history in general, did it include the lowland groups that Emperor Menelik the First had brought into the territory during the great expansion and who now make up most of the country’s 70 plus (the number varies depending on the source) “nations, nationalities, and peoples”, or did it privilege the Ethiopian highlanders? Did the highlanders, in effect, colonize the lowlanders? Contemporarily, we also wondered how ethnic-federalism was working. Is the system creating more opportunities for conflict or is it bringing peace? When almost all African countries have seemed to embrace Samora Machel’s motto that “for the nation to live, the tribe must die,” the Ethiopians have turned it upside down, prioritizing their “ethnic” differences over their Ethiopian-ness.

While only there for two weeks, we met and spoke with a wide variety of people: from government ministers, to civil society leaders, political opposition candidates, regional council members, federal police, street vendors, journalists, researchers, NGO workers, and our indispensable student liaisons from Addis Ababa University’s Institute for Peace and Security Studies who provided us with exceptional and intimate insight to our many, many questions. It is not a robust survey, but everyone we spoke with seemed to favor the ethnic-federal structure, although many commented that it “works better on paper.” The older generation emphasized that they had not been allowed to speak their home languages under the communist Derg regime and they praised the current system and the efforts of the EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) government to honor the country’s many diverse cultures.

Ethiopia is a fascinating country and though similar in certain aspects considered typical of Africa, it is indeed an exception on the continent. This study visit was only the start of a process of peeling back the country’s complex layers. In this short space, I cannot even touch on Ethiopia’s policies as a developmental state; its history of political repression; civil society legislation; the fact that several Ethiopians referred to it as “the capital of Africa”; it is the home of the Rastafarians; and perhaps what we found most surprising and remarkable – that Addis Ababa has an amazing collection (thousands plus) of classic VW Beetles that we saw driving all over the city! Ultimately, the trip left us with more questions than it answered and different questions than we had going into it! From beginning to end, the study visit was a remarkable experience and I must thank Sara Njeri (now Doctor Njeri!) for her dedicated work in setting up and managing logistics (especially her diplomacy with the bus driver!) and Dr. David Harris for shepherding this little flock of students as we applied classroom theories to the real world. Namasiganalen! (Thank you all!)


[Image: ASV group visiting Hawassa at the Rift Valley where they met with the Regional Administration]

Enter Ethiopia: Africa Study Visit 2015, Part 1

[Image: Lion of Judah Monument in Addis Ababa]

Dr. David Harris is a Lecturer in African Studies at the University of Bradford. In addition to leading the Africa Study Visit programme, he has also recent published Sierra Leone: A Political History

[Part 2 of this series can be found here and the photo gallery here]

The latest in a long line of Africa Study Visits (ASV) took us this year to a new destination for the ASV: Ethiopia. Somewhere between 10 and 20 MA students have undertaken the ASV to countries such as Sierra Leone (2008 and 2014), Liberia (2013) and Rwanda (2011 and 2012). This year a party of 14 – myself as Academic Leader, Sarah Njeri, the Coordinator, and 12 students – flew out to Addis Ababa in February. And we came back much more the wiser two weeks later.

The ASV goes every year to an African post-conflict country and the choice of the country is decided bearing in mind language and security priorities. The main objective of the ASV is to allow students to broaden and deepen their understanding and practical experience of the complexities involved in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction in Africa. A themed schedule is put together where students meet and interview government ministers, security officials, society leaders, domestic and international civil society activists and staff, academics and, very importantly, other students. Our mantra is that it has been a particularly successful visit if everyone comes home with more questions than when they left.


[Image: The ASV group with the Federal Minister for  Education His Excellency Ato Shiferaw Shigutie]

In Ethiopia, we stayed most of the time in Addis and met with, amongst many others, the Minister of Education, the police, the African Union which is headquartered in Addis, opposition politicians, local NGOs, Western donors, and postgraduate students from the University of Addis Ababa. At the weekend, we went down into the Rift Valley to Hawassa, where we met with the Regional Administration and spent some earned leisure time at three different lakes, including Lake Abijata with its thousands of pink flamingos. We were accompanied almost all of the time by two postgraduate students who were a mine of information for us and who became very much part of the team.

Amongst all this activity, it is of great concern that there is a daily forum for just ourselves to discuss findings, experiences, concerns and thoughts of the day and to relate these to theoretical frameworks and comparisons elsewhere. This forum has previously been named after local fora for discussion – for instance, the Palaver Hut in Liberia – and in Ethiopia, we duly inaugurated the Adbar. For at least an hour every day, this became our open discussion time before we went for a shared dish of injera (the Ethiopian staple) and sauces accompanied by tej (Ethiopian honey wine), a Sudanese feast, or a bowl of pasta.

It is not always easy to get along all the time, particularly when faced with what are often new experiences and what are always new and difficult intellectual challenges. This group, made up of nine nationalities, and twelve women and two men, emerged unscathed – despite being delayed by snow and losing our luggage in Istanbul on the way home – and we even managed to have two nights of communal cooking, one of which was prepared by the two males in the part….

Indeed, my thanks go to everyone for an enjoyable ASV.

Illusions of Democracy: LSE Study on Mobile Phones and “Statebuilding”

[Image credit: UNHCR_Displacement in South Sudan A Camp Within a Camp, K.McKinsey/ January 2014; Here camp residents are charged $50 to power-up their mobile phones]

Recent research at the London School of Economics in South Sudan’s state of Equatoria, has revealed a complex picture of the impact of mobile phone technology in democracy.

Whilst mobile phones and social media had less of a role in South Sudan independence than they did in the so-called Arab Spring, they apparently are having an unexpected effect on political participation in the country.

The following findings were made:

People living in areas with mobile phone coverage, while more likely to feel well-informed and more likely to hold political and administrative leaders to account, were less likely to vote with a sense of being able to influence political change and no more or less likely to be satisfied with political and administrative leaders.’

‘In fact, it seems that those with mobile phone access are less likely to vote—because those in areas with coverage were more frustrated with the experience of the last election. Those living without mobile phone coverage had retained a sense that elections might bring change.’

This may seem alarming (undoubtedly shatters the perceptions of many about the transformative nature of mobile phone technology), and yet unsurprising. Is it not common wisdom that democracy (at least for those in countries that posses it, or aspire to it) is the best but flawed form of governance? There is an illusive quality to democracies everywhere, which will vary according to interpretation. Consider for instance the disaffection of many Western civic bodies with contemporary politics as demonstrated by poor voter turn out? Does cynicism  and disappointment come with increased in involvement in democracy? In South Africa the case of the ANC is perhaps symptomatic of this paradox.

On surface value the LSE report does not seem to distinguish between satisfaction and support for democracy or political actors and processes, on the one hand, and criticality of participants on the other. European Democracy researcher Han-Dieter Klingermann, based on a longitudinal study, suggests that at least a third of democrats in Europe support the idea of democracy, but are dissatisfied with its functioning.

The specific features of South Sudan today (long civil war, “resource curse”, communal tensions, political divides, threat of sanctions) certainly have little to do with Western democracy, yet the globality of mobile technology and social media in politics may yield the same generalization: democracy is illusory, but it is the only oasis we have.


Further reading:

Off the Hook: Can Mobile Phones Help with Statebuilding? LSE Blog.

Schomerus and Rigterink, ‘‘And Then He Switched off the Phone’: Mobile Phones, Participation and Political Accountability in South Sudan’s Western Equatoria State,’ (2015).

Justice and Security Research Programme, South Sudan Survey Report, LSE (2013). 

Herman Wasserman, ‘Mobile phones, popular media and everyday African democracy: transmissions and transgressions,’ (2010).

Through Seas and Jungles: The Tragedy African of Migration

[Image credit: Antonio Parrinello_Reuters Wednesday, March 04 2015_migrant coffin Augusta Italy]

A young Eritrean family of three, also expecting another child, have resided in “The Jungle” for several months: no sanitation, little clean water, and even less hope of escaping their current limbo. According a recent Guardian investigation, this family hoped to stow away onto a channel ferry into the UK, via a trans-continental goods lorry. Located in at a public park in the port town of Calais, France, this family of migrants-refugees-human beings are among many who trickle here from various locations in North Africa, and other conflict ridden zones. This is “The Jungle”, labelled not least because the desperate situation induces its own conflict boundaries. Reports of the factional nature of this desperate way-station, with the Sudanese guarding their own corner and “home-made” latrines, and the Kurds renowned for mafia like presence, reproduces the violence that many of The Jungle inhabitants have tried to escape in their home countries.

Contemporary commentary of this crisis and the seemingly never-ending stream of migrants from Africa to Europe offers a picture of recent escalation in these movements. UNHCR statistics, cited in a National Geographic piece, claim that migration from Africa (and Syria) jumped from 169,271 in January 2013 to 350,775 in September 2014, doubling over 21 months. Of note, the largest single country shedding migrants is Eritrea. The above Guardian commentary on The Jungle reports a significant number of Eritreans, including the young family of three this article began with. Political oppression experienced in Eritrea, and increasing unemployment in under performing economies, like Ghana, and long term conflicts, like Sudan, appear to continue to push migrants to the promise of a prosperous Europe (see recent post on documentary series on African perception on migration to Europe). However, this trend precedes the recent boom. In 2006 just over 22,000 Africans, mostly North Africans, made their way across the Mediterranean. In this same BBC report, 24 died in a capsized dingy off the Maltese coast in June 2007. The dynamic of remittances being sent back home, also feeds the promise of not only individual prosperity, but that of increasing the welfare of one’s family. Migrants who survive the trek and places like The Jungle, and live in poverty working menial jobs, are able to send home vital cash payments. In 2010 these payments reached $40 billion US. This figure has been steadily growing from $10 billion US in 1990. Whilst the explosion is a recent phenomenon, the story is not new.

Since the 2013 sinking of at least 300 Somalis, Eritreans and Ghanaians near the Italian island of Lampedusa, Western media occasional throw a bone to the steady stream of the “drowned and (occasionally) the saved”.  Primo Levi’s assessment of the villains and victims of the camp system is appropriate: those caught in the camps were subject to the structures and power struggles let loose at the heart of the genocide in Europe. Levi’s situating these actors in “the gray zone” offers a more compelling explanation than perhaps the ever variable and changing degrees and origin points of push and pull. The economic structures that lay behind such factors provide a systemic level framing of such political and economic migration, and create a dynamic of chaos only clear observable in the sea and jungle. The demand for cheap labour has defined most capitalist economies since the Industrial Revolution. Whether you are a fruit picker in California, a Chinese sex worker in Japan, or a Eritrean cleaning toilets in Italy, the implication is the same, global structures so disproportionately favoring the Global North enable instability in regions like North Africa, in the name of maintaining the order and security of hyper-consumerist lifestyles. This perpetration of a gray zone, manifests in horrible living/working conditions for migrants, and life-threatening geographies of transit in the sea and jungle.

Integral to the hidden workings of capitalism’s cheap labour is the business of human trafficking. Such smuggling activity ranges from informal to multileveled networks, and often run deep in many North African economies. Blessing, a Nigerian who fled a Boko Haram attack in her village, reported paying for smuggled passage and being locked in a boat:

“It was July 15, 2013. We were 150 people in the dark, crouched down together on the deck, sitting. But the boat broke down, and we drifted seven days at sea. Sun and heat and no water! Fifteen people died. I was so afraid, I shut my eyes. I don’t know what they did with the bodies. Finally another trafficking boat came and took only the girls, us 20. We left the others and don’t know what happened to them.”

The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, makes a further distinction between a range of activities encompassing smuggling and human trafficking, in-between which occur varying degrees of exploitation and extortion. The presence of these trade networks add onus not only onto African governments to disincentivize such means of migration, but also onto Global North governments to tackle the long-term issues of global inequality (not to mention reckless foreign policy and adventurist intervention that destroys Global South countries, and produces another generation of migrants- think Syria and Libya). Detention centres across Europe displace the Kantian right to hospitality, and betray the lack of coherent, humane policy.

Seyla Benhabib reminds us of the paradox of this ideal:

“The Universal Declaration is silent on states’ obligations to grant entry to immigrants, to uphold the right of asylum, and to permit citizenship to alien residents and denizens. These rights have no specific addressees and they do not appear to anchor specific obligations of compliance on the part of second and third parties. Despite the cross-border character of these rights, the Declaration upholds the sovereignty of individual states”

This tension written into the heart and soul of international relations, also manifests in what Benhabib calls the “disaggregation of citizenship (and) sovereignty”: whilst states increasingly out-source public functions to the global market (a trend on the rise in Africa, as China and Europe engage in natural resource and infrastructure economies), citizenship, if Europe’s trend is not unique, is being broadened out to include the excluded, offering rights to migrants currently caught in the gray zone of the global economy. Yet, the promise of such citizenship is being thwarted by the securitization of immigration policy and the “Othering” of the migrant entrenched in Western societies.

Marjorie, a Uganda asylum seeker in the UK, describes the process that bounced her asylum claim around for seven years as horrific, casting doubt on Benhabib’s mixed optimism: “Whatever the system, they torture people diplomatically. They are not beating you, they are not raping you, but then they just leave you in that limbo”. While the risk of drowning in the Mediterranean, being reduced to camp life in Calais or staring down poverty in the Global South pockets of the geography of the Global North, Africans are still compelled to traverse the sea and jungle in hope of barely existing prosperity. Regardless of the motivation, the manifest brutality of migration only further demonstrates the increasingly apparent scale of global inequality and the total apathy of its benefactors.

Further Reading:

Migrant Files, 2013

International Organization for Migration, Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration, 2014.

Brief summary of Primo Levi’s The Drowned and the Saved

Freedom in Libya- a view from Tanzania

We received a mass circulation email this week from Tanzania which set out the virtues of the fallen Libyan regime….it is interesting to see another perspective on this….here it is in full….:

1. There is no electricity bill in Libya; electricity is free for all its

His Offence:
This makes it impossible for private western companies to operate in the
electricity sub-sector. Remember their ‘international community’s’ reaction
to the free education, health and water services policies of Mwalimu?

2. There is no interest on loans, banks in Libya are state-owned and loans
given to all its citizens at 0% interest by law.

His Offence:
How can a western bank operate in such an environment? Particularly
unforgivable is the insistence that ALL banks must be national!

3. Home considered a human right in Libya Gaddafi vowed that his parents
would not get a house until everyone in Libya had a home. Gaddafi’s father
has died while him, his wife and his mother are still living in a tent.

His Offence:
This puts him in a populist and radical nationalist category. Nationalism is
the opposite of globalisation, on the back of which liberal capitalism

4. All newlyweds in Libya receive $60,000 Dinar (US$50,000) by the
government to buy their first apartment so to help start up the family.
Traditional wedding in Tripoli, Libya

His Offence:
Same as above. After all, he’s able to finance this because he won’t allow
foreigners to ‘own’ and exploit Libya’s natural resources!

5. Education and medical treatments are free in Libya. Before Gaddafi only
25% of Libyans were literate. Today the figure is 83%.

His Offence:
He committed the same offence as Tanzania’s Nyerere, leading to sanctions
that forced the latter to retire because deteriorating standards of living
for the larger population.

6. Should Libyans want to take up farming career, they would receive farming
land, a farming house, equipment, seeds and livestock to kick-start their
farms- all for free.

His Offence:
All this is funded by oil revenue, which should have been for Western

7. If Libyans cannot find the education or medical facilities they need in
Libya, the government funds them to go abroad for it not only free but they
get US$2,300/month accommodation and car allowance.

His Offence:
As above! The more he has of such commitments, the more difficult it becomes
for Foreigners to access oil.

Moreover, Libya could become a bad of example for other Middle Eastern oil
producing countries. Look at what came of Venezuela!!

8. In Libyan, if a Libyan buys a car, the government subsidised 50% of the

His Offence:
Wanting to show the world there can be an alternative to capitalism.

9. The price of petrol in Libya is $0.14 per litre.

His Offence:
Nationalising and keeping ALL oil under State ownership and control.
Otherwise, profit margins for oil companies would have made sure the price
of oil (when available) is substantially higher.

10. Libya has no external debt and its reserves amount to $150 billion now
frozen globally.
Great Man-Made River project in Libya $27 billion

His Offence:
Without debt, it is very difficult to influence Libya’s policies on
anything. It make a country really ‘independent’ of the ‘international

And, this kind of reserves are making it increasingly easy for him to
bankroll the African Union (and some African governments unfriendly to Sam),
making Western control of the AU difficult and costly.

11. If a Libyan is unable to get employment after graduation the state would
pay the average salary of the profession as if he or she is employed until
employment is found.

His Offence:
Populism; and pursuing policies that may suggest there is an alternative to

12. A portion of Libyan oil sale is, credited directly to the bank accounts
of all Libyan citizens.

His Offence:
Populism; and pursuing policies that may suggest there is a better
alternative to capitalism while denying western companies an opportunity to
milk the oil!

13. Every mother who gives birth to a child receives US$5,000.

His Offence:
See above!!

14. 40 loaves of bread in Libya costs $ 0.15!

His Offence:

15. 25% of Libyans have a university degree:

His Offence:
Making education too cheap for nationals by footing most of the related

16. Gaddafi carried out the world’s largest irrigation project, known as the
Great Man-Made River project, to make water readily available throughout the
desert country.

His Offence:
Accomplishing such mega-sized projects without asking for the West’s
support, implying they can actually be irrelevant!!

Which other dictator has done much good to his people besides?

There can be no alternative to private sector led capitalism, pursued by a
State that has no Western minders!”